

UPI AT5

FOIAb3b

DAY LEAD BAY OF PIGS

EDITOR'S NOTE--LIKE AN ICEBERG, MUCH OF WHICH LIES UNSEEN BENEATH THE SURFACE OF THE SEA, DETAILS OF THE DECISIONS LEADING TO THE TRAGIC BAY OF PIGS INVASION OF 1961 HAVE BEEN HIDDEN FOR FOUR YEARS. THIS WEEK THREE OFFICIALS OF THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION PUBLISHED THEIR VIEWS OF THE EVENT. IN THIS DISPATCH, A UPI CORRESPONDENT EXAMINES THREE STATEMENTS.

BY ROBERT F. BUCKHORN

UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL

WASHINGTON, JULY 23 (UPI)--THREE MEMBERS OF THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION HELD PUBLIC POST-MORTEMS THIS WEEK ON THE ILL-FATED, AND STILL CONTROVERSIAL, BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

IF THERE WAS A CONSENSUS, IT WAS THIS: THE TWO-DAY INVASION ATTEMPT AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO'S CUBA IN 1961, FAILED BECAUSE OF A CONFUSION THAT RANGED FROM PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S CONCEPT OF THE INVASION PLAN TO THE INDIVIDUAL CUBAN REBEL WHO BELIEVED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT LET THE INVASION FAIL.

THE FIRST OF KENNEDY'S FORMER ADVISERS TO REPORT WAS ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR. A HISTORIAN BY PROFESSION, AND A PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT DURING KENNEDY'S TERM, SCHLESINGER PUBLISHED EXCERPTS FROM A FORTHCOMING BOOK IN LIFE MAGAZINE.

ACCORDING TO SCHLESINGER, KENNEDY FOUND OUT ABOUT THE PLANNED INVASION 12 DAYS AFTER HIS ELECTION. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT THE FIRST LINK IN THE CHAIN WAS FORGED THAT LED TO THE FIASCO ON THE CUBAN BEACHES IN APRIL OF 1961.

BRIEFED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CHIEF ALLEN D. DULLES, KENNEDY ORDERED THE PLANNING TO CONTINUE. BUT HE DID SO WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT HE WAS NOT TO BE COMMITTED TO ITS EVENTUAL ENFORCEMENT, SCHLESINGER SAID.

BUT AS THE PLANNING PROGRESSED, SCHLESINGER SAID KENNEDY DID NOT GIVE AN ORDER TO STOP--DESPITE A PLEA FROM ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE CHESTER BOWLES AND SEN. J. WILLIAM FULLER D-ARK.

SAID SCHLESINGER: "THE DETERMINATION TO KEEP THE SCHEME ALIVE SPRANG IN PART, I BELIEVE, FROM THE EMBARRASMENTS OF CALLING IT OFF. EVEN IF THE CUBAN BRIGADE WERE SUCCESSFULLY DISBANDED, ITS MEMBERS WOULD DISPERSE, DISAPPOINTED AND RESENTFUL, ALL OVER LATIN AMERICA. THEY WOULD TELL WHERE THEY HAD BEEN AND WHAT THEY HAD BEEN DOING, AND THEY WOULD EXPLAIN HOW THE UNITED STATES HAD LOST ITS NERVE."

BUT THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION DID CAUTION THE CUBANS, SCHLESINGER SAID. HE SAID BOTH HE AND FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ADOLPH A. BERLE WERE SENT TO NEW YORK TO TELL THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL THAT THERE WOULD BE NO SUPPORT BY U. S. ARMED FORCES IN THE UPCOMING INVASION.

SCHLESINGER SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE COUNCIL DID NOT BELIEVE THE MESSAGE. HE SAID THEY PREFERRED TO THINK THAT THEY WOULD HAVE THE BACKING OF 10,000 U.S. SOLDIERS, PROMISED TO THEM BEFORE KENNEDY CAME TO OFFICE.

ANOTHER OF KENNEDY'S CLOSE AIDES--THEODORE C. SORESEN--PUBLISHED AN EXCERPT FROM HIS BOOK IN LOOK MAGAZINE. HE SUMMED UP THE SITUATION SURROUNDING THE PLANNING FOR THE INVASION IN THIS WAY:

THE KEY TO KENNEDY'S ERROR, SORESEN SAID, LAY IN THE FACT THAT HE HAD APPROVED AN INVASION PLAN "BEARING LITTLE RESEMBLANCE TO WHAT HE THOUGHT HE HAD APPROVED."

ACCORDING TO SORESEN, "THAT SO GREAT A GAP BETWEEN CONCEPT AND ACTUALITY SHOULD EXIST AT SO HIGH A LEVEL ON SO DANGEROUS A MATTER REFLECTED A SHOCKING MISTAKE IN THE PROCESS, ERRORS THAT PERMITTED BUREAUCRATIC MOMENTUM TO GOVERN INSTEAD OF POLICY LEADERSHIP."